Banks play a unique role in society. They not only maximize profits but also consider the interests of stakeholders. We investigate whether banks consider firms’ pollution records in their lending decisions. The evidence shows that banks offer significantly higher loan spreads, higher total borrowing costs, shorter loan maturities, and greater collateral to firms with higher levels of chemical pollution. The costly effects are stronger for borrowers with greater risk and weaker corporate governance. Further, the results show that banks with higher (...) social responsibility account for their borrowers’ environmental performance and charge higher loan spreads to those with poor performance. These results support the idea that banks with higher social responsibility can promote the practice of business ethics in firms. (shrink)

Background: People in both Taiwan and China originally descended from the Han Chinese, but the societies have been separated for approximately 38 years. Due to different political systems, variations exist in healthcare and nursing education systems in Taiwan and China. Objective: The purpose of this study was to examine the professional values of nursing students in Taiwan and China. Design: A cross-sectional design was applied in this study. The Nursing Professional Value Scale–Revised was used to measure the professional values of (...) the students. The questionnaire was distributed to eligible undergraduate students in a classroom setting. Ethical considerations: This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the first investigator’s university. Participants were informed that completion and return of the questionnaire was voluntary, and confidentiality was ensured by keeping the responses anonymous. Participants: A convenience sample included 292 Taiwanese students and 654 Chinese students. Findings: A total of 11 individual Nursing Professional Value Scale–Revised items showed significant differences between the two groups. These results reflect the differences in the perceived importance of these items between the groups. There was no significant difference between the two groups in the mean overall scores for the Nursing Professional Value Scale–Revised (p =.766) and three subscales (all p >.05). Conclusion: There are some differences in professional values between nursing students in Taiwan and China. Given the increasingly frequent and close interactions between Taiwan and China and the globalization of nursing, understanding these differences may help nursing educators identify students’ perceptions of their professional values and support the development of strategies to improve weaknesses in professional values. (shrink)

This essay argues that the idea of name-rectification ( zheng ming 正名) in the Xunzi can be properly reconstructed as revealing a normative pragmatic semantic theme that linguistic contents embody, and are embedded in, the normative, justificatory network, or pattern, of dao li 道理 (proper routes/patterns of norm) which, in turn, is constituted and manifested by social inferential justificatory practices of bian shuo 辯說 (dialectical justification/explanation).

The Mohist conceives the dao-following issue as "how we can put dao in words and speeches into practice." The dao-following issue is the Mohist counterpart of Wittgenstein's rule-following problem. This paper aims to shed light on the rule-following issue in terms of the Mohist answer to the dao-following problem. The early Mohist takes fa(法, standard)and the later Mohist takes lei(類, analogy)as the key to the dao-following issue. I argue that the way of fa is not viable. Fa comes in various (...) forms, but all of them are regarded as being cut off from everyday life and therefore subject to various interpretations and, hence, incapable of action-guiding. On the other hand, the Mohist lei represents a kind of life world action drama. A lei situates various elements of action in the context of an everyday life scene. I argue that lei is more qualified than fa in answering to the dao-following issue. I also show that lei substantializes what McDowell calls the "course between a Scylla and a Charybdis" hinted in terms of Wittgenstein's idea of "custom," "practice," and "institution" in regard to the rule-following problem. (shrink)

With the widespread use of vaccines in research and clinical settings, there is an urgent need to standardize vaccine representation, integrate information across diverse vaccine types, and support computer-assisted reasoning. Accordingly, we have since 2007 developed the community-based Vaccine Ontology (VO), which aligns with the Basic Formal Ontology and adheres to OBO Foundry principles. VO models ontologically vaccines, vaccine components, vaccine immune responses, vaccine investigation studies and other vaccine-related topics. VO represents more than 10,000 vaccines targeting 289 infectious pathogens and (...) cancers in humans and over 30 nonhuman animal species. VO provides mappings to external resources such as RxNorm, CVX, FDA, and USDA. Various VO use cases exist. VO facilitates vaccine standardization in resources such as the VIOLIN vaccine database, ImmPort, and the Vaccine Adjuvant Compendium (VAC). Semantic queries can be made to query VO. VO has been shown to enhance experimental and clinical vaccine data analysis and vaccine literature mining. Overall, VO standardizes vaccine modeling and representation and greatly supports vaccine AI research in the Semantic Web era. (shrink)

馬克思《數學手稿》與微積分理論具有何種關係；現代數學的研究物件是純量還是結構；數學是經驗科學還是演繹科學；實踐檢驗數學的真理性是否只有一種真假判斷；非線性科學揭示出自然界存在一類新的、更普遍的、既確定 又隨機的混沌現象，它向決定論自然觀提出哪些挑戰，是否說明世界是非決定論的；等等。對這些問題，作者從數學哲學的角度提出了自己的見解和解決方法。.

林毓生是研究近現代中國思想史的著名學者，其英文論著《中國意識的危機》在1980 年代出版中、日、韓譯本，對於東亞地區、台灣和大陸的學界與文化界都有極大的影響，奠定了他在西方和東亞近現代思想史領域的重要地位。從1960 年起在芝加哥大學攻讀博士期間，受海耶克（F. A.Hayek）親自指導和影響，林毓生對自由主義在中國前途的討論提出以往中文世界從未觸碰到的關鍵議題，使海耶克的理論以及西方其他重要思想家的言說獲得真切實際的理解與融合，轉為建設本土憲政民主的有利資源 ，成為重建文化認同的價值基礎。 《現代知識貴族的精神》共收錄34 篇林毓生的代表著作，主要在2000 年以後發表， 按照其學術追求與思想關懷，分別編入「意識危機的探索與回應」、「自由的基礎與理據」、「學思之路與民主建設」及「人文傳統的存續與『創造性轉化』」四個範疇以及附錄。整體來看，這些彼此具有密切關聯的範疇及其所 涵攝的各篇文章，可以說是構成林先生對中國自清末以來尋找現代性出路的一個系統性的論述。讀者可以看到林毓生對「現代性」這個二十世紀中國最迫切的根本問題提出的研究分析，以及他認為解決這一問題的可行路徑。他提 出了憲政民主在中文世界前途的看法與觀點，而數十年來的論述，代表了他以學術思想的言說介入公共議題的巨大努力。.

In ‘Equity and Marxist Buddhism,’ Tzu-wei Hung engages with the Marxist Buddhism developed by Taiwanese philosopher Lin Qiu-wu in the 1920s, brings this underexplored theory to the table and discusses a few merits and insights of the theory. Building on Hung’s analysis, this paper elaborates on the lessons and insights that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism provides for modern times. The first three lessons are distinctive points that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism brings to the discussion on combining Marxism and Buddhism: the connections between (...) the ethical and political, the responsibility for pursuing social justice and the nonviolent means towards social justice. The last lesson comes at the meta-philosophical level, focusing on how Hung’s engagement with Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism sheds light on the issue of diversifying the discipline philosophy. Overall, I argue that Taiwanese Marxist Buddhism not only makes contributions to theoretical frameworks while providing a practical means for pursuing equity and social justice, but it also manifests the epistemic and moral values for engaging with under-represented philosophical traditions. (shrink)

In Spinoza’s metaphysics, we encounter many puzzling doctrines that appear to entangle metaphysical notions with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. According to him, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, are defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. He defines an attribute as that which an intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance. Intellectual (...) perception, something cognitive, is used to define an attribute, something metaphysical. And he claims that if something exists there is a reason why it exists and if something doesn’t exist there is also a reason why it doesn’t. Thus, a reason, something cognitive or epistemic, is necessary for existence or nonexistence. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Between being and reason? In this book, I argue for what might be called a realist interpretation: although Spinoza is confident that the order of being mirrors the order of reason, he believes that they are two orders, not one. There is inherence over and above conceptual dependence; there is causation in addition to causal explanation; the world has a nature that we can grasp and that our way of grasping it does not interpose an impenetrable conceptual veil between it and us. (shrink)

Invariabilism is the view that the same theory of welfare is true of every welfare subject. Variabilism is the view that invariabilism is false. In light of how many welfare subjects there are and how greatly they differ in their natures and capacities, it is natural to suppose that variabilism is true. I argue that these considerations do not support variabilism and, indeed, that we should accept invariabilism. This has important implications: it eliminates many of the going theories of welfare (...) while making some of the remaining ones more attractive. (shrink)

According to the experience requirement on well-being, differences in subjects’ levels of welfare or well-being require differences in the phenomenology of their experiences. I explain why the two existing arguments for this requirement are not successful. Then, I introduce a more promising argument for it: that unless we accept the requirement, we cannot plausibly explain why only sentient beings are welfare subjects. I argue, however, that because the right kind of theory of well-being can plausibly account for that apparent fact (...) about welfare subjects even if the requirement is false, this argument does not succeed. I tentatively conclude that no compelling case can be made for the requirement. (shrink)

Subjectivism about welfare is the view that something is basically good for you if and only if, and to the extent that, you have the right kind of favorable attitude toward it under the right conditions. I make a presumptive case for the falsity of subjectivism by arguing against nearly every extant version of the view. My arguments share a common theme: theories of welfare should be tested for what they imply about newborn infants. Even if a theory is intended (...) to apply only to adults, the fact that it is false of newborns may give us sufficient reason to reject it. (shrink)

abstract: Leibniz holds that there are no two perfectly similar things, a doctrine he calls the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (the PII). What is his attitude toward its modal status? Most commentators hold that the principle is best understood as a necessary truth because it is allegedly entailed by doctrines such as the conceptual containment theory of truth, the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR), and the denial of purely extrinsic denominations, which are arguably regarded by Leibniz as (...) necessary truths. In this paper, I argue against this consensus and show that (1) neither the conceptual containment theory of truth, nor the PSR, nor the denial of purely extrinsic denominations give Leibniz a good reason to hold that the PII is necessary; (2) Leibniz says that the PII is contingent in the correspondence with Clarke and not for dialectical reasons; and (3) the argument that Leibniz gives for the PII in §21 of his Fifth Letter to Clarke has been misunderstood; properly interpreted, it gives Leibniz a cogent argument rooted in some of his most important doctrines for the conclusion that the PII is a contingent truth. (shrink)

On phenomenological theories of pleasure, what makes an experience a pleasure is the way it feels. On attitudinal theories, what makes an experience a pleasure is its relationship to the favorable attitudes of the subject who is having it. I advance the debate between these theories in two ways. First, I argue that the main objection to phenomenological theories, the heterogeneity problem, is not compelling. While others have argued for this before, I identify an especially serious version of this problem (...) that resists existing solutions, and I explain why even this version of the problem does not undermine phenomenological theories. Second, I argue that a grand reconciliation can be effected between the two types of theory: it can be true both that pleasures are pleasures in virtue of the way they feel and that they are pleasures in virtue of how they are related to their subjects’ favorable attitudes, so long as the attitudes that are constitutively related to pleasures are ones that feel a certain way. Hybrid views of this sort have significant advantages over pure attitudinal or phenomenological views. (shrink)

The experience machine was traditionally thought to refute hedonism about welfare. In recent years, however, the tide has turned: many philosophers have argued not merely that the experience machine doesn't rule out hedonism, but that it doesn't count against it at all. I argue for a moderate position between those two extremes: although the experience machine doesn't decisively rule out hedonism, it provides us with some reason to reject it. I also argue for a particular way of using the experience (...) machine to argue against hedonism – one that appeals directly to intuitions about the welfare values of experientially identical lives rather than to claims about what we value or claims about whether we would, or should, plug into the machine. The two issues are connected: the conviction that the experience machine leaves hedonism unscathed is partly due to neglect of the best way to use the experience machine. (shrink)

X-linked dominant Conradi-Hunermann syndrome is one of a group of disorders with aberrant punctate calcification in cartilage, or chondrodysplasia punctata. This is most prominent around the vertebral column, pelvis and long bones in CPDX2. Additionally, CDPX2 patients may have asymmetric rhizomesomelia, sectorial cataracts, patchy alopecia, ichthyosis and atrophoderma. The phenotype in CDPX2 females ranges from stillborn to mildly affected individuals identified in adulthood. CDPX2 is presumed lethal in males, although a few affected males have been reported. We found increased 8-cholestenol (...) and 8-dehydrocholesterol in tissue samples from seven female probands with CDPX2. This pattern of accumulated cholesterol intermediates suggested a deficiency of 3β-hydroxysteroid- Δ8,Δ7-isomerase, which catalyses an intermediate step in the conversion of lanosterol to cholesterol. A candidate gene encoding a sterol-Δ8-isomerase has been identified and mapped to Xp11.22-p11.23. Using SSCP analysis and sequencing of genomic DNA, we found EBP mutations in all probands. We confirmed the functional significance of two missense alleles by expressing them in a sterol-Δ8- isomerase-deficient yeast strain. Our results indicate that defects in sterol-Δ8-isomerase cause CDPX2 and suggest a role for sterols in bone development. (shrink)

Prudential value is the kind of value that something has when it is good for someone, in the sense that is conceptually tied to welfare or well‐being. Impersonal value is the kind of value that something has when it is good simply, absolutely, or “from the point of view of the universe.” According to the Moorean position on prudential value, the concept of prudential value can be analyzed in terms of that of impersonal value and is unintelligible if it is (...) not so analyzed. I answer some recent arguments for the Moorean position due to Kris McDaniel and Thomas Hurka, and I make a more comprehensive case than has thus far been made for rejecting that position. (shrink)

This paper calls for a paradigm shift in studying academic dependency, towards the paradigm of brokered dependency. Using Chinese academia as an example, I demonstrate how the neocolonial condition of academic dependency is always mediated through blockage-brokerage mechanisms. The two most salient blockage-brokerage mechanisms of dependency in the Chinese context are linguistic barrier and authoritarian malepistemization, and the effects of the latter consist of three layers: institutional, informational and incorporational. On top of their domestic impacts, those mechanisms jointly exacerbate spectacularized (...) postcoloniality in anglophone-hegemonic global academic publishing. The paradigm of brokered dependency not only represents a more nuanced approach to the study of academic dependency, but also underscores the fact that the dismantling of the neocolonial condition cannot be conceived and pursued in isolation from comprehending and confronting the authoritarian condition, especially when the latter pertains under the disguise of anticolonialism. (shrink)

Structural injustice exists when the influence of social structure exposes some groups of people to undeserved burdens while conferring unearned power to others. It has been argued that the responsibility for addressing structural injustices should be shared among those participating in the social structure and can only be discharged through collective action; however, the proper form of collective action does not happen easily. To address structural injustice effectively, we need to gain clarity on the practical challenges that are involved and (...) explore possible means of implementing shared responsibility. This chapter thus aims to contribute to the study of addressing structural injustice in the following two ways. First, building on previous studies, I categorize three forms of practical challenges that have been encountered by existing proposals for discharging shared responsibility for structural injustice. Second, I offer an alternative proposal, which I will refer to as the deliberative mini-public proposal, and argue that it has the potential to mobilize structural change and better overcome the identified practical challenges. (shrink)

Which entities should the desire theory of well-being deem basically good for you—good for you in the most fundamental way? On the object view, what is basically good for you when one of your desires is satisfied is the object of that desire. On the combo view, what is basically good for you when one of your desires is satisfied is the combination or conjunction of the object of that desire and the fact that you have that desire. I argue (...) that which of these views the desire theory accepts makes no difference to what it implies about anyone’s amount of well-being. Then, I consider the main arguments that have been given for the superiority of one or the other of those two views. Finding none of those arguments persuasive, I conclude that we lack good grounds for rejecting the initial impression that it would be natural to have about those views: that it does not matter which of them the desire theory accepts. (shrink)

The call to make artificial intelligence (AI) more democratic, or to “democratize AI,” is sometimes framed as a promising response for mitigating algorithmic injustice or making AI more aligned with social justice. However, the notion of “democratizing AI” is elusive, as the phrase has been associated with multiple meanings and practices, and the extent to which it may help mitigate algorithmic injustice is still underexplored. In this paper, based on a socio-technical understanding of algorithmic injustice, I examine three notable notions (...) of democratizing AI and their associated measures—democratizing AI use, democratizing AI development, and democratizing AI governance—regarding their respective prospects and limits in response to algorithmic injustice. My examinations reveal that while some versions of democratizing AI bear the prospect of mitigating the concern of algorithmic injustice, others are somewhat limited and might even function to perpetuate unjust power hierarchies. This analysis thus urges a more fine-grained discussion on how to democratize AI and suggests that closer scrutiny of the power dynamics embedded in the socio-technical structure can help guide such explorations. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that subjectivists about welfare must claim that the favorable attitudes whose satisfaction is relevant to your well-being are those that you would have in idealized conditions (e.g. ones in which you are fully informed and rational). I argue that this is false. I introduce a non-idealizing subjectivist view, Same World Subjectivism, that accommodates the two main rationales for idealizing: those given by Peter Railton and David Sobel. I also explain why a recent argument from Dale Dorsey (...) fails to show that subjectivists must idealize. Because Same World Subjectivism is a plausible non-idealizing view, subjectivists about welfare needn't idealize. (shrink)

Theories of well-being purport to identify the basic goods and bads whose presence in a person's life determines how well she is faring. Monism is the view that there is only one basic good and one basic bad. Pluralism is the view that there is either more than one basic good or more than one basic bad. In this paper, I give an argument for pluralism that is general in the sense that it does not purport to identify any basic (...) goods or bads. If I am right, then even if you cannot name a single basic good or bad, you can know that pluralism is true. (shrink)

Pluralistic theories of well-being might appear unable to accommodate just how important pleasure and pain are to well-being. Intuitively, there is a finite limit to how well your life can go for you if it goes badly enough hedonically (e.g. because you never feel any pleasure and you spend two years in unrelenting agony). But if there is some basic good distinct from pleasure, as any pluralistic theory must claim, then it seems that you could be made arbitrarily well off (...) by being given enough of that good even if your life is hedonically terrible. My aim is to defend pluralistic theories against this objection. After replying to the simplest version of it, I will answer a more sophisticated version of it that has recently been leveled by Theron Pummer. (shrink)

Although the idea that sexual violence is a “structural” problem is not new, the lack of specification as to what that entails blocks effective responses to it. This paper illustrates the concept of sexual violence as structural in the sense of containing a type of moral wrong called “structural wrong” and discusses its practical implications. First, I introduce a distinction between two types of moral wrongs—interactional wrongs and structural wrongs—and I argue that the moral problem of sexual violence includes both (...) types, each of which calls for a different set of moral responses. Second, drawing on Iris Marion Young’s social connection model of responsibility, I argue that recognizing the structural-wrong element of sexual violence does not reduce individual perpetrators’ responsibility for it. Instead, it implies that a broader group of agents are required to join collective actions to reform the social structure. I conclude by evaluating some preventive programs against sexual violence through the lens of structural wrongs and providing directions to advance them. (shrink)

Many believe that normative reasons for action are necessarily connected with the promotion of certain states of affairs: on Humean views, for example, there is a reason for you to do something if and only if it would promote the object of one of your desires. But although promotion is widely invoked in discussions of reasons, its nature is a matter of controversy. I propose a simple account: to promote a state of affairs is to make it more likely to (...) obtain than it previously was. I argue that this view has been unfairly neglected, that it avoids serious problems faced by many other views, and that it is a contender for the correct theory of promotion. (shrink)

A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In (...) the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone experiences an attitudinal pleasure, his welfare is (other things equal) higher during the pleasure. Finally, I argue that any subjectivist about welfare should find disjunctive desire satisfactionism highly attractive. (shrink)

It has become commonplace to distinguish enumerative theories of welfare, which tell us which things are good for us, from explanatory theories, which tell us why the things that are good for us have that status. It has also been claimed that while hedonism and objective list theories are enumerative but not explanatory, desire satisfactionism is explanatory but not enumerative. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. When properly understood, every major theory of welfare is both enumerative and (...) explanatory. (shrink)

While I find Huaping Lu-Adler’s excavation of Kant’s long-overlooked linguistic Orientalism both enlightening and thought-provoking, I disagree with her diagnosis of its theoretical and practical relevance. On the one hand, while I agree that Kant’s positionality renders all his writings and teachings presumptively impactful, there is reason to doubt that his peculiar construction of the linguistic Oriental Other had much actual impact on his disciples. On the other hand, while I agree that the Kantian ideal of public reason is inapt (...) for rectifying the linguistic-epistemic injustices of global knowledge production, I disagree on why it is so. In particular, I argue for a shift in theoretical and practical focuses, from linguistic biases and prejudices, to the structural epistemic constraints of linguistic diversity, as well as to other political-structural conditions shaping global knowledge production. (shrink)

This paper proposes a theory of perceptual responsibility, which I term perceptual responsibilism. The theory comprises three central claims: (1)We have perceptual responsibilities—responsibilities to perceive in certain ways—as moral, social, or epistemic agents; (2) These responsibilities are epistemic in nature, or at least exhibit a unified epistemic character; (3) When a person forms a belief based on a perceptual experience that was irresponsibly formed, that belief is doxastically unjustified, assuming no other basis is available.

Otsuka (2023) argues for a correspondence between data science and traditional epistemology: Bayesian statistics is internalist; classical (frequentist) statistics is externalist, owing to its reliabilist nature; model selection is pragmatist; and machine learning is a version of virtue epistemology. Where he sees diversity, I see an opportunity for unity. In this article, I argue that classical statistics, model selection, and machine learning share a foundation that is reliabilist in an unconventional sense that aligns with internalism. Hence a unification under internalist (...) reliabilism. (shrink)

Abstract: The growing debate over zetetic responsibility—our duty to inquire or inquire further—has split into two main camps: the epistemic camp, which treats it as a distinctive form of epistemic normativity, and the practical camp, which argues it is wholly practical. This paper contends that both views are incomplete. Zetetic normativity is pluralistic, grounded in practical, socio-epistemic, and genuinely epistemic reasons. Through an analysis of cases—including high-stakes decisions, social-epistemic roles, and situations involving salient or opaque evidence—I show that obligations to (...) inquire arise from varied sources. To unify these, I advance a Zetetic Transmission Principle: if an agent has final reason to adopt a settled attitude toward a question, and inquiry serves as a means to that end, then they have a corresponding reason to inquire, matching the nature and strength of the final reason. This framework not only addresses objections such as overgeneralization and normative clashes but also clarifies the structure and source of zetetic obligations. In doing so, it offers a more nuanced and comprehensive theory of why, when, and in what form we ought to inquire. (shrink)

In this chapter, we examine the key moral issues for the intelligence community with regard to the use of robots for intelligence collection. First, we survey the diverse range of spy robots that currently exist or are emerging, and examine their value for national security. This includes describing a number of plausible scenarios in which they have been (or could be) used, including: surveillance, attack, sentry, information collection, delivery, extraction, detention, interrogation and as Trojan horses. Second, we examine several areas (...) in which spy robots present serious ethical and legal challenges. We conclude by examining some moral concerns with shifting from intelligence collection to action, as enabled by robotics technology. (shrink)

According to a recent proposal, the epistemic aim of metaphysics as a discipline is to chart the different viable theories of metaphysical objects of inquiry (e.g. causation, persistence). This paper elaborates on and seeks to improve on that proposal in two related ways. First, drawing on an analogy with how-possibly explanation in science, I argue that we can usefully understand this aim of metaphysics as the charting of epistemically possible answers to metaphysical questions. Second, I argue that in order to (...) account for the epistemic goodness of this aim, one should appeal to the epistemic value it has in virtue of providing resources for non-factive understanding of the objects of metaphysical inquiry.**This paper is part of a special issue of Argumenta on the Epistemology of Metaphysics**. (shrink)

Bernard Williams contends that philosophy is part of a broader humanistic enterprise of “making sense of” ourselves and our activities, including the activity of science. Whereas the scientific enterprise purports to offer an absolute conception of the world as it is (independently of any local perspective on it), the humanistic enterprise cannot disengage itself from the contingent history of our ideas upon which it operates. While I agree with Williams that philosophy should be more attentive to history, his account of (...) philosophy, from which he derives this conclusion, is fatally flawed, being unable to meet three perennial challenges to any principled defense of philosophy as a discipline: i.e. the questions of authority, incubativity and peculiarity. Those challenges can be met only if we understand philosophy not as a humanistic discipline that is part of the broader humanistic enterprise, but as a distinctively normative discipline that tasks itself with finding answers to explicitly or implicitly normative questions, in contrast to various scientific and humanistic disciplines of descriptive inquiry. In this paper, I argue for the equivalence of philosophicality with normativity, explicate the theoretical and practical implications of the normative account of philosophy, and defend it against potential objections. (shrink)

In their timely and compelling article, Quiñones and Puzio argue that digital twins (DTs) hold potential for empowering trans healthcare by enabling more personalised and inclusive forms of care.1 While I appreciate their optimism, I propose a critical re-evaluation: to reflect more deeply on the ontological assumptions embedded within DT architectures themselves. Drawing on feminist science and technology studies (STS) and queer phenomenology, I suggest that the prevailing norms of datafication and computational legibility may fail to capture the lived, out-of-line (...) and disoriented experiences that often characterise trans embodiment. Rather than anchoring users to a static model, Quiñones and Puzio rightly emphasise that DTs must be designed to accommodate the open, fluid and dynamic identity, particularly in ways that support trans persons in exploring and affirming their evolving selves. DTs should remain adaptive and responsive to change, creating space for more expansive ontologies of gender and offering alternative ways of (re)imagining the multiplicity in trans(ition) trajectories and futures, both for healthcare providers and for trans patients.1[p.5] While their vision is ambitious, it raises important questions about whether current data-driven architectures and algorithmic systems can truly accommodate …. (shrink)

The debate between scientific realism and anti-realism remains at a stalemate, making reconciliation seem hopeless. Yet, important work remains: exploring a common ground, even if only to uncover deeper points of disagreement and, ideally, to benefit both sides of the debate. I propose such a common ground. Specifically, many anti-realists, such as instrumentalists, have yet to seriously engage with Sober's call to justify their preferred version of Ockham's razor through a positive account. Meanwhile, realists face a similar challenge: providing a (...) non-circular explanation of how their version of Ockham's razor connects to truth. The common ground I propose addresses these challenges for both sides; the key is to leverage the idea that everyone values some truths and to draw on insights from scientific fields that study scientific inference—namely, statistics and machine learning. This common ground also isolates a distinctively epistemic root of the irreconcilability in the realism debate. (shrink)

In “Confucianism and Same-Sex Marriage,” published recently in Politics and Religion, Professor Tongdong Bai argues for a “moderate Confucian position on same-sex marriage,” one that supports its legalization and yet endeavors “to use public opinion and social and political policies to encourage heterosexual marriages, and to prevent same-sex marriages from becoming the majority form of marriages” (Bai 2021:146). Against the backdrop of downright homophobia prevalent among vocal Confucians in mainland China today, Bai claims that his pro-legalization rendition “show[s] a different (...) version of Confucianism that challenges the received perception of Confucianism that it is deeply conservative, a perception that often lies at the core of the rejection of its contemporary relevance, especially by the so-called ‘liberals’ in China and elsewhere” (Bai 2021:133). Furthermore, Bai claims that his moderate Confucianism is normatively preferrable to “the typical liberal or individualist position” of a marriage equality supporter, because the specter of polygamy – the conservative trope of invoking polygamy as a reductio ad absurdum against same-sex marriage – imposes “a serious challenge” to liberals but not to moderate Confucians (Bai 2021:146, 153). -/- Both of Bai’s claims falter upon scrutiny, however. Granted, it is applaudable that Bai tries to dissuade his more conservative Confucian colleagues from opposing the legalization of same-sex marriage. But as Section 1 of this Response will show, the alternative rendition of Confucianism he presents, along with the way he presents it, is premised on a highly contested conception of what shared Confucian values are; does injustice to Confucians who embrace marriage equality more unreservedly (i.e., without caveats à la Bai); fails to produce new arguments that “enrich the theoretical basis for same-sex marriage” (Bai 2021:133); and, ironically, reinforces – rather than “challenges” – the “received perception” of Confucianism as deeply conservative. Meanwhile, Section 2 will show that Bai’s comparison between liberalism and moderate Confucianism relies both upon an apparent unfamiliarity with the extensive and nuanced liberal discussions on polygamy, and upon fallacious methods of assessing comparative normative valence. -/- Finally, Section 3 will offer some concluding thoughts from the perspective of decolonial theory, examining the dynamic of spectacularized postcoloniality that propels the production and consumption of dubious theoretical projects like Bai’s. As it turns out, this case serves not only as a cautionary tale of how not to conduct comparative normative theorizing, but also as a cautionary tale of how not to let the spectacle of postcoloniality derail the pursuit of academic decolonization. (shrink)

Humeans about normative reasons claim that there is a reason for you to perform a given action if and only if this would promote the satisfaction of one of your desires. Their view has traditionally been thought to have the revisionary implication that an agent can sometimes lack any reason to do what morality or prudence requires. Recently, however, Mark Schroeder has denied this. If he is right, then the Humean theory accords better with common sense than it has been (...) thought to. I argue that Schroeder is mistaken, even if welfare is understood in terms of the satisfaction of one’s desires: any Humean must concede that one can sometimes lack any reason to act morally or prudently. I also identify a novel variant on Humeanism that could perhaps avoid its revisionary implications about prudence if desire satisfactionism is the correct theory of welfare. (shrink)

Empiricist modal epistemologies can be attractive, but are often limited in the range of modal knowledge they manage to secure. In this paper, I argue that one such account – similarity-based modal empiricism – can be extended to also cover justification of many scientifically interesting possibility claims. Drawing on recent work on modelling in the philosophy of science, I suggest that scientific modelling is usefully seen as the creation and investigation of relevantly similar epistemic counterparts of real target systems. On (...) the basis of experiential knowledge of what is actually the case with the models, one can draw justified conclusions about what is de re possible for the target systems. (shrink)

Several philosophers of science claim that scientific toy models afford knowledge of possibility, but answers to the question of why toy models can be expected to competently play this role are scarce. The main line of reply is that toy models support possibility claims insofar as they are credible. I raise a challenge for this credibility-thesis, drawing on a familiar problem for imagination-based modal epistemologies, and argue that it remains unanswered in the current literature. The credibility-thesis has a long way (...) to go if it is to account for the epistemic merits of toy models. (shrink)

In contemporary analytic philosophy of art, the intentionalist debate is about whether the author’s intention is relevant to the interpretation of her work. Various positions have been proposed, and in this paper I defend what I call hypothetical author-hypothetical intentionalism, the position that interpretation is based on the intention attributed to the author constructed from the work. There are three aims to achieve: (1) to give a general account of hypothetical author-hypothetical intentionalism; (2) to present a moderate version of hypothetical (...) author-hypothetical intentionalism; (3) to defend the moderate version of hypothetical author-hypothetical intentionalism against actual intentionalism and actual author-hypothetical intentionalism. Against the current trend that focuses on actual authors, I hope to show that the hypothetical author account is still a sustainable contender in the intentionalist debate. (shrink)

: Perhaps the central problem which preoccupies Spinoza as a moral philosopher is the conflict between reason and passion. He belongs to a long tradition that sees the key to happiness and virtue as mastery and control by reason over the passions. This mastery, however, is hard won, as the passions often overwhelm its power and subvert its rule. When reason succumbs to passion, we act against our better judgment. Such action is often termed 'akratic'. Many commentators have complained that (...) the psychological principles that Spinoza appeals to in his account of akrasia are mere ad hoc modifications to his philosophical psychology. I show, on the contrary, that these principles follow from some of the most important and interesting aspects of Spinoza's philosophy of mind. (shrink)